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TO HAVE AND TO HOLD: THE FUTURE OF 
DNA RETENTION IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 
Jason M. Swergold* 
Abstract: The United Kingdom’s National DNA Database, in existence 
since 1995, is now in jeopardy after the European Court of Human Rights 
ruled that the United Kingdom’s DNA retention policy violates a person’s 
right to a private life under the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The retention program is the most sweeping in the world and had previ-
ously withstood a number of challenges in British courts. The ECHR deci-
sion now presents the United Kingdom with the problem of complying 
with the judgment while protecting the Database it has built over the last 
three decades. The question that remains is whether the United Kingdom 
can do both. 
Introduction 
 On December 4, 2008, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR), sitting as a Grand Chamber, unanimously held that the United 
Kingdom (U.K.) had violated the right to a private life under Article 8 
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (Convention) by retaining the fingerprints and 
DNA samples1 of individuals “suspected but not convicted of offences.”2 
The United Kingdom’s National DNA Database (Database) is believed 
to be the largest in the world3 and had previously withstood a challenge 
in the House of Lords from the same applicants who have now suc-
                                                                                                                      
* Jason M. Swergold is the Executive Note Editor for the Boston College International & 
Comparative Law Review. 
1 For purposes of this Note, the term “DNA samples” refers to both DNA samples and 
profiles, unless otherwise indicated (i.e. “DNA profiles”). For a discussion of the difference 
between a DNA sample and a DNA profile, see R (S & Marper) v. Chief Constable of the S. 
Yorkshire Police, (2004) 1 W.L.R. 2196, 2200 (H.L.) (U.K.) (“The samples consist of what 
is taken by the police . . . , and any sub-samples or part samples retained from these after 
analysis. The DNA profiles are digitised information and it is this digitised information 
that is stored electronically . . . together with details of the person to whom it relates.”). 
2 S & Marper v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 30562/04 & 30566/04, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
50, 1202 (2009). 
3 DNA and Human Rights: Throw It Out, Economist, Dec. 6, 2008, at 44. 
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ceeded in the ECHR.4 As a result of the Court’s ruling, the U.K. must 
determine the appropriate method for implementing the decision so as 
to secure the right to privacy for the applicants and for other similarly 
situated persons.5 
 The contrasting decisions in the ECHR and in the House of Lords 
illuminate a tension that exists between ECHR jurisprudence and that 
of the national courts: namely, that when interpreting Convention 
rights, the ECHR considers the prevailing attitudes across the Contract-
ing States,6 yet this may not accurately reflect the attitudes and con-
cerns present in the forum state.7 The question that now remains is 
whether this recent decision has sounded the death knell for the Unit-
ed Kingdom’s Database8 or whether the United Kingdom can modify 
its current retention procedures to comply with the decision.9 
 Part I of this Note traces the history of the statutory scheme that 
governs the taking and retention of DNA samples and provides the 
framework for the Database. This section also looks at public opinion in 
the United Kingdom with regards to the Database. Part II discusses both 
the House of Lords and the ECHR’s reasoning in their respective deci-
sions in the Marper case. It then contrasts the different understandings 
of a right to privacy in the United Kingdom and under the Convention 
and ECHR jurisprudence. Finally, Part III criticizes the ECHR’s decision 
in Marper and analyzes whether there are feasible options for continuing 
to retain the DNA of individuals who have not been convicted. 
I. Background 
A. The Database Legislation 
 The current state of the United Kingdom’s National DNA Data-
base is the result of a series of acts passed by Parliament that govern the 
collection and retention of samples.10 Beginning in 1984, these acts 
sought first to clarify the power of the police as it existed under the 
                                                                                                                      
4 See Marper, 1 W.L.R. at 2210 (H.L.). 
5 See S & Marper, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1204. 
6 See Marper, 1 W.L.R. at 2217 (H.L.) (Lord Rodger of Earlsferry). 
7 See id. at 2216 (Lord Rodger of Earlsferry). 
8 See DNA and Human Rights: Throw It Out, supra note 3, at 44. 
9 See DNA Database ‘Breach of Rights,’ BBC News, Dec. 4, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/uk_news/7764069.stm (last visited Mar. 9, 2010). 
10 See Genetic Testing and the Criminal Law 187–88 (Don Chalmers ed., 2005). 
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common law11 and second, to expand upon those powers.12 Parlia-
ment’s initial announcement of police power in this area was the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), which contained provisions 
granting the police the power to collect both fingerprints13 and inti-
mate14 and non-intimate samples.15 The first section of PACE dealing 
with fingerprints provided for the collection of fingerprints from per-
sons convicted of a recordable offense who had yet to have their prints 
taken.16 As a precondition for the taking of all fingerprints from sus-
pects (as opposed to offenders), the police had to obtain appropriate 
consent except when certain conditions were met.17 A police officer of 
at least the rank of superintendent could authorize the taking of fin-
gerprints18 if he had “reasonable grounds for suspecting the involve-
ment of the person whose fingerprints [were] to be taken in a criminal 
offense”19 and if he believed “that his fingerprints [would] tend to con-
firm or disprove his involvement.”20 
 The taking of samples was governed by similar provisions, but with 
two notable differences.21 Samples, both intimate and non-intimate, 
could only be taken if there were a reasonable belief that the person was 
involved in a serious arrestable offense, as opposed to a recordable of-
fense.22 Moreover, intimate samples could not be collected unless the 
                                                                                                                      
11 See Mike Redmayne, The DNA Database: Civil Liberty and Evidentiary Issues, Crim. L.R. 
437, 442 (1998). 
12 See Explanatory Notes to the Criminal Justice and Police Act, 2001, para. 210 (ex-
plaining the new retention policy). See generally id. (noting that the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994 widened the police’s power to take samples). 
13 Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, § 61. 
14 Id. § 62. Parliament defined intimate samples as “a sample of blood, semen or any 
other tissue fluid, urine, saliva or pubic hair, or a swab taken from a person’s body orifice.” 
Id. § 65. 
15 Id. § 63. Parliament defined non-intimate samples as: 
a sample of hair other than pubic hair; a sample taken from a nail or from 
under a nail; a swab taken from any part of a person’s body other than a body 
orifice; a footprint or a similar impression of any part of a person’s body oth-
er than a part of his hand. 
Id. § 65. 
16 Id. § 27(1). 
17 Id. § 61(1). For the definition of appropriate consent, see id. § 65. 
18 Id. § 61(3)(a). 
19 Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c.60, § 61(4)(a). 
20 Id. § 61(4)(b). 
21 See id. §§ 62–63. 
22 Id. §§ 62(2)(a), 63(3)(a). An arrestable offense for purposes of PACE is generally 
defined as an offense with a sentence fixed by law and any offense that carries a minimum 
sentence of five years imprisonment for persons over the age of 21. Id. § 24(1). A record-
able offense is one “for which the conviction may be recorded in National Police Records. 
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person consented;23 non-intimate samples could be taken absent con-
sent under the same restrictions as fingerprints.24 With the guidelines 
for collection laid out, Parliament next addressed the issue of retaining 
the fingerprints and samples.25 The provision was very straightforward: 
fingerprints and samples were to be destroyed if the person were cleared 
of the offense, not prosecuted, or not suspected of having committed 
the crime.26 
 While PACE provided the early foundation for sample collection, it 
took ten years before the proper framework was in place to support the 
creation of the Database.27 In 1994, Parliament enacted the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act (CJPO 1994) in response to developments 
in DNA profiling and to ensure that criminal investigations were deriv-
ing “the maximum benefit from DNA.”28 The CJPO 1994, which indi-
rectly became the statutory foundation for the Database29 and was the 
first set of amendments to PACE,30 significantly expanded the power of 
the police in a number of ways.31 First, the police were now permitted 
to collect intimate (subject to consent) and non-intimate samples from 
a person suspected of any recordable offense.32 Since 1994, this provision 
                                                                                                                      
Currently, this includes any offense, which upon conviction, carries a sentence of impris-
onment, and certain non-imprisonable offenses.” Kent Police, N53 Police Reference: 
Intimate, Non-intimate, and DNA Database Samples § 3.7, http://www.kent.police.uk/ 
About%20Kent%20Police/policies/n/n053.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2010). 
23 Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c.60, § 62(1)(b). 
24 See id. § 63(3). 
25 Id. § 64. 
26 See id. §§ 64(1)(a) (cleared of the offense), 64(2)(b) (not prosecuted), 64(3)(b) 
(not suspected of having committed the crime). In addition, Parliament provided an extra 
layer of protection by granting the person in question the right to witness the destruction 
of his/her samples and fingerprints upon request. See id. § 64(6). 
27 See generally Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33 (expanding police 
powers and redefining sample collection and retention procedures). 
28 Home Office, Proposals for Revising Legislative Measures on Fingerprints, 
Footprints, and DNA Samples 10 (1999), available at http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 
ERORecords/HO/421/2/ppd/fingdna.pdf [hereinafter Home Office Proposals]. 
29 See Helen Wallace, The UK National DNA Database: Balancing Crime Detection, Human 
Rights and Privacy, 7 Eur. Molecular Biology Org. Reps S26, S26 (Special Issue 2006). 
Despite the fact that the CJOP made the database possible, Parliament never enacted spe-
cific legislation to set up the Database. See Parliament Office of Sci. and Tech., The 
National DNA Database 2 (2006) [hereinafter National DNA Database]. 
30 Robin Williams & Paul Johnson, Inclusiveness, Effectiveness, and Intrusiveness: Issues in 
the Developing Uses of DNA Profiling in Support of Criminal Investigations, 34 J.L. Med. & Eth-
ics, 234, 236 (2006). 
31 See Redmayne, supra note 11, at 442. 
32 See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33, §§ 54(3)(b) (intimate samples), 
55(3) (non-intimate samples). Interestingly, this provision was contrary to the suggestion by 
the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice that certain crimes be included under serious 
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has allowed sample collection for virtually any offense.33 Second, the 
CJPO 1994 reclassified mouth swabs and non-pubic hair plucked from 
the root as non-intimate samples, thereby eliminating the need for con-
sent.34 This was in response to the recognition that the interests of jus-
tice would be better served by the collection of these samples, which 
could provide valuable DNA evidence.35 Third, Parliament brought 
sample collection more in line with that of fingerprints by providing 
that non-intimate samples could be collected without consent from 
persons convicted of any recordable offense.36 Finally, samples which 
were required to be destroyed under § 64 of PACE could now be re-
tained if another person were convicted of the same offense, and that 
person had also given a sample in the course of the investigation.37 Par-
liament was careful to explicitly prohibit the use of the newly retained 
samples as evidence against the person or for any investigative pur-
poses.38 Instead, the sample was retained and could be further analyzed 
only if the conviction of the third-party required subsequent review.39 
 With the legal framework for collecting and retaining fingerprint 
and DNA samples established, the Database went into effect on April 
10, 1995.40 Since then, there have been three significant changes to 
PACE (as amended by the CJPO 1994) that were responsible for the 
expansion of the Database.41 In 1997, Parliament passed the Criminal 
Evidence (Amendment) Act, which increased the number of offenders 
in the database.42 The Act provided for the non-consensual collection 
of non-intimate (but now including mouth swabs) samples of any of-
fender who had been convicted of a sexual or violent offense prior to 
                                                                                                                      
arrestable offenses, rather than simply open all criminal offenses to collection. See The Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice, Report, 1993, Cm. 2263, ch. 2, para. 33. 
33 See National DNA Database, supra note 29, at 1 (defining recordable offenses as 
“most offenses other than traffic offenses”); see also Leonard Jason-Lloyd, The Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994: A Basic Guide for Practitioners 43 (1995) (list-
ing “loitering or soliciting for the purposes of prostitution” and “tampering with a motor 
vehicle” as other recordable offenses); Wallace, supra note 29, at S26 (listing begging, par-
ticipating in an illegal demonstration, and being drunk and disorderly as recordable of-
fenses). 
34 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, § 58(3). 
35 See The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, supra note 32, ch. 2, paras. 28–
29. 
36 See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, § 55(2). 
37 See id. § 57(3). 
38 See id. 
39 See Home Office Proposals, supra note 28, at 11. 
40 See Redmayne, supra note 11, at 437. 
41 See National DNA Database, supra note 29, at 2. 
42 See Redmayne, supra note 11, at 445. 
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April 10, 1995 and who was currently serving the sentence for those 
crimes.43 This provision allowed the police to collect samples from 
some of the most serious offenders who had entered the system prior to 
the expansion of collection power under the CJPO 1994.44 Parliament 
further relaxed restrictions on collecting samples by removing the re-
quirement that the officer believe the sample would confirm or dis-
prove his suspicion that the suspect had been involved in the investi-
gated offense.45 Under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, a non-intimate 
sample could be taken without consent so long as the person was “in 
police detention as a consequence of his arrest for a recordable of-
fense” and the police had not yet taken a sample from him in the 
course of the investigation.46 Thus, collecting a sample no longer had 
to be relevant to the investigation of the offense.47 
 The most police-empowering change to the law as it existed under 
the CJPO 1994, however, came as a result of the Criminal Justice and 
Police Act 2001 (CJP 2001).48 Prior to this Act, retention of samples had 
been expressly prohibited under PACE,49 and, later, allowed under the 
CJPO 1994 for non-investigative purposes.50 Despite these restrictions, 
the police had been illegally retaining samples, and in some cases, us-
ing them in investigations.51 A 1999 Home Office study of the existing 
legislation proposed that the retention policy should be amended to 
allow for retention of samples collected from volunteers (as opposed to 
actual suspects), subject to their written consent.52 The proposal, how-
ever, was not intended to cure the police violations of the current re-
tention program; instead, it was focused on eliminating the need to re-
collect samples from volunteers.53 Furthermore, the study addressed 
                                                                                                                      
43 Criminal Evidence (Amendment) Act, 1997, c. 17, § 1(1)–(3). The Act also provided 
sample collection from offenders who had been convicted of recordable offenses before 
April 10, 1995, and were now detained pursuant to the Mental Health Act 1983. Id. For a 
list of the offenses covered under the Act, which also included incitement or conspiracy to 
commit the enumerated offenses, see id., sched. 1. 
44 See Redmayne, supra note 11, at 445. 
45 See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 10(2). 
46 See id. Even if the police had taken a non-intimate sample, they were authorized to 
take another one if the first proved to be insufficient. See id. 
47 National DNA Database, supra note 29, at 2. 
48 See Criminal Justice and Police Act, 2001, c. 16, § 82. 
49 See Police and Criminal Evidence Act, § 64. 
50 See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, § 57. 
51 See Antony Barnett, Fury at Police DNA Database, Guardian (London), June 11, 2000, at 
4 (News), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/jun/11/antonybarnett.theobserver. 
52 Home Office Proposals, supra note 28, at 11. 
53 See id. 
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the need for adequate safeguards and recommended the ability of a 
person to withdraw his or her consent at any time.54 
 The CJP 2001 expanded retention powers beyond those proposed 
by the Home Office.55 Under section 82 of the CJP 2001, samples taken 
under the CJPO 1994 were no longer required to be destroyed and 
could be subsequently used for “purposes related to the prevention or 
detection of crime, the investigation of an offence or the conduct of a 
prosecution.”56 This provision, while authorizing the retention of all 
samples taken after the Act went into effect, also provided for the reten-
tion of illegally retained samples that should have been destroyed under 
the preexisting law.57 The CJP 2001 adopted the Home Office’s proposal 
concerning consensual retention of volunteered samples but signifi-
cantly departed from the proposal by providing that consent given by a 
volunteer could not be withdrawn.58 Finally, the CJP 2001 expanded the 
power of the police to use the retained samples for speculative searches, 
whereby the sample is checked against the Database as well as records 
held by police forces outside the United Kingdom.59 
B. Public Opinion and the DNA Database 
 The DNA Database and the corresponding retention policy have 
drawn mixed reactions in the United Kingdom.60 The first major ex-
pansion of the Database was proposed by Prime Minister Tony Blair in 
1999 and called for the collection of DNA samples from all known of-
fenders.61 Prior to the passing of the CJP 2001, government leaders 
pushed hard for retention of DNA from exonerated individuals62 after 
                                                                                                                      
54 See id. 
55 Compare Criminal Justice and Police Act, § 82 (providing retention of samples from 
all suspects, regardless of the outcome of the investigation), with Home Office Proposals, 
supra note 28, at 11 (proposing retention of volunteered samples only). 
56 Criminal Justice and Police Act, § 82(2). The Explanatory Notes indicate that this 
provision was a direct result of the decisions in the Court of Appeal and House of Lords 
concerning the admission of DNA evidence that had been illegally retained. See Explana-
tory Notes to the Criminal Justice and Police Act, 2001, para. 210. Prior to the Act, the 
House of Lords had ruled that the admission of such evidence was within the judge’s dis-
cretion. See id. 
57 See Criminal Justice and Police Act, § 82(6). 
58 See id. § 82(4). 
59 See id. § 81(2). The use of a sample, as provided in § 82(2), also includes the use of 
any information derived from the sample (“DNA profile”). Id. § 82(2). 
60 See The DNA Database: Big, Bigger, Biggest, Economist, Mar. 1, 2008, at 59. 
61 Home Office, Forensic Science and Pathology Unity, DNA Expansion Pro-
gramme 2000–2005: Reporting Achievement 3 (2005). 
62 Duncan Carling, Note, Less Privacy Please, We’re British: Investigating Crime with DNA in 
the U.K. and the U.S., 31 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 487, 492 (2008). Prime Minister 
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the Court of Appeal ruled two men accused of murder and rape, re-
spectively, could not be convicted, despite “compelling evidence,” be-
cause the police had matched both suspects by using illegally retained 
DNA samples.63 In contravention of the retention policy then in place, 
the police illegally retained the DNA samples of the two men, leading 
many civil liberty groups to voice their concern over the police action 
and its interference with the privacy of innocent people.64 In 2001, Par-
liament responded to public concern over the existing law65 with the 
CJP 2001, which provided for the retention of samples collected from 
individuals who had not been convicted.66 The new policy was not 
without opposition, most notably from the human rights watchdog Lib-
erty in its House of Lords Briefing on the CJP 2001.67 While conceding 
that the government had a valid concern in effectively preventing 
crime, the group felt that many of the provisions of the Act presented a 
“serious extension of the state’s power and erosion of existing civil lib-
erties.”68 As of 2005, the CJP 2001 allowed the authorities to link sam-
ples collected before the new law with over 8,000 crime scene stains and 
samples from over 13,000 offenses.69 Additionally, the government has 
been able to obtain convictions in a number of high-profile cold cases70 
and a pair of cases involving two of the most brutal murders in recent 
British history.71 
 The success of using retained DNA samples to bring a number of 
criminals to justice has led some to call for an even greater expansion 
                                                                                                                      
and Labour Party leader Tony Blair announced the expansion of the DNA program. See id. 
Interestingly, Tony Blair and the Labour Party committed early in the 1990s to drafting a 
Bill of Rights for Great Britain and incorporating the Human Rights Act into British Law. 
See Francesca Klug, A Bill of Rights: Do We Need One or Do We Already Have One?, 2001 Pub. L. 
701, 704 (2007). 
63 See Barnett, supra note 51. The House of Lords subsequently ruled that evidence ob-
tained as a result of the use of illegally retained samples was not automatically inadmissi-
ble, but was an issue for the trial judge to decide. R (S and Marper) v. Chief Constable of 
the S. Yorkshire Police, (2004) 1 W.L.R. at 2196, 2199 (H.L.) (U.K.). 
64 See Barnett, supra note 51. 
65 Marper, 1 W.L.R. at 2198 (H.L.). 
66 See Criminal Justice and Police Act, 2001, c. 16, § 82(2). 
67 See Liberty, Criminal Justice and Police Bill: House of Lords Briefing 5 
(2001), http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/pdfs/policy01/mar-cjpb.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2010). 
68 Id. at 2. 
69 S and Marper v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 30562/04 & 30566/04, 48 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 50, 1195 (2009). 
70 Mark Townsend & Anushka Asthana, How Two Brutal Killers Fuelled the DNA Debate, 
Observer (London), Feb. 24, 2008, at 28 (Focus), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
uk/2008/feb/24/ukcrime.forensicscience. 
71 Id. 
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of the Database.72 Britain’s leading expert on police forensics has pro-
posed the inclusion of children in the Database if they exhibit behavior 
that indicates that they may be future criminals.73 Both the public74 and 
members of the government75 have lashed out against this proposal, 
especially after the Home Office revealed that almost 40,000 innocent 
children were in the Database.76 Lord Justice Sedley advocated an 
equally unpopular suggestion of making the DNA Database universal 
for the purposes of crime prevention.77 Despite the success of the Data-
base in recent murder convictions, the Home Office has flatly rejected 
this proposal for a compulsory Database.78 
 Taking into account the clearly controversial nature of the Data-
base and retention program, many have declared that there needs to 
be more public debate on the issue.79 In fact, the DNA Database was 
not submitted for public discussion at its creation, nor was there any 
public debate accompanying the extension of the Database and its 
                                                                                                                      
72 See Mark Townsend & Anushka Asthana, Put Young Children on DNA List, Urge Police, 
Observer (London), Mar. 16, 2008, at 1 (News), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
society/2008/mar/16.youthjustice.children [hereinafter “Put Young Children on DNA List”]; 
The DNA Database: Big, Bigger, Biggest, supra note 60, at 59. 
73 See Put Young Children on DNA List, Urge Police, supra note 72. 
74 See Matthew Squires, Thousands of Kids on DNA Database, Lancashire Evening Post, 
Dec. 29, 2008, http://www.lep.co.uk/news/thousands-of-kids-on-DNA.4828460.jp (“Com-
munity leaders and children’s charities said it was ‘unethical’ for young people’s DNA to be 
added and stored on the system.”). 
75 DNA Database Contains 39,000 Innocent Children, Home Office Admits, Guardian (Lon-
don), Aug. 15, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2008/aug/15/youthjustice.young 
people. 
76 Id. 
77 Senior Judge: Put All of UK on DNA Database, Times Online (London), Sept. 5, 2007, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article2390338.ece. Lord Justice Sed-
ley stated that the Database was “indefensible” because it only included those persons who 
happened to come into contact with the criminal justice system. Clare Dyer, Anger Over Call 
to Widen DNA Database, Guardian (London), Sept. 6, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
uk/2007/sep/06/ukcrime.prisonsandprobation (last visited, Mar. 31, 2010). The current 
system, according to Sedley, resulted in a disproportionate number of people from ethnic 
minorities being put in the database. See id. By including every citizen in the Database 
solely for the purpose of crime detection and prevention, the system would be fairer. See id. 
78 Ben Quinn, Calls for Compulsory DNA Database Rejected, Guardian (London), Feb. 23, 
2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/feb/23/ukcrime. 
79 See Human Genetics Commission, A Citizens’ Inquiry into the Forensic Use of 
DNA and the National DNA Database: Evaluation Report 4 (2008), available at 
http://www.hgc.gov.uk/UploadDocs/DocPub/Document/Citizens%20Inquiry%20-
%20Citizens%20Report.pdf; The National DNA Database, supra note 29, at 4; Gene-
Watch UK, The UK Police National DNA Database, http://www.genewatch.org/sub-
539478 (last visited Mar. 9, 2010). 
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uses.80 Any debate would likely focus on the proper way to balance the 
personal rights of individuals with the compelling interests of the gov-
ernment.81 Given Home Secretary Jacqui Smith’s statement that “the 
existing law will remain in place while we carefully consider the judg-
ment,” the decision of the ECHR has created the opportunity for pub-
lic debate to contribute to the future of the Database.82 
II. Discussion 
 The Marper case is especially important to the discussion of the Da-
tabase. The opposite outcomes in the House of Lords and the ECHR 
reveal the different ways in which privacy is viewed in the United King-
dom and under the Convention.83 In rendering its decision in Marper, 
the ECHR continued its liberal approach towards protecting individual 
rights,84 while the House of Lords focused more on the benefits of the 
Database and subsequent use of retained DNA.85 
A. A Difference of Opinion 
 In the early months of 2001, two British citizens, Michael Marper 
and S (a minor), were arrested for harassment and attempted robbery, 
respectively.86 Following the arrests, the police took the fingerprints 
and DNA samples of each person.87 Marper’s partner, the victim of the 
harassment, decided not to press charges, and the Crown Prosecution 
Service discontinued the case;88 S went to trial on his attempted rob-
bery charge and was acquitted.89 Both individuals were informed by the 
                                                                                                                      
80 See Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Forensic Use of Bioinformation: Eth-
ical Issues 3 (2007). 
81 See GeneWatch UK, The UK Police National DNA Database, supra note 79. 
82 DNA Database ‘Breach of Rights,’ supra note 9. 
83 Compare R (S & Marper) v. Chief Constable of the S. Yorkshire Police, (2004) 1 
W.L.R. 2196, 2210 (H.L) (U.K) (holding that retention did not engage Article 8(1)), with 
Case of S & Marper v. The United Kingdom, App. Nos. 30562/04 & 30566/04, 48 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 50, 1189 (2009) (holding that the “mere storing of data relating to the private 
life of an individual amounts to an interference within the meaning of Article 8”). 
84 See Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights 23 (4th ed. 2007) (“The 
Court has increased enormously in standing and efficacy over the last 30 years, partly due 
to its activism and creativity in interpreting the Convention and its willingness to find that 
Member states have violated the rights of individuals.”). 
85 See Marper, 1 W.L.R. at 2210–11 (H.L.). 
86 R (S and Marper) v. Chief Constable of the S. Yorkshire Police, (2002) 1 W.L.R. 
3223, 3226–27 (A.C.) (U.K.). 
87 See id. at 3227. 
88 Id. at 3227–28. 
89 Id. at 3227. 
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principal fingerprint officer of the South Yorkshire Police that their 
fingerprint and DNA samples would be retained by the police pursuant 
to the CJP 2001.90 Marper and S applied for judicial review of the offi-
cer’s decision in the Divisional Court, where Judge Leveson held that 
the retention of the fingerprints and DNA samples did not contravene 
the right to a private life under Article 8 of the Convention.91 On ap-
peal, a majority of the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal upheld the 
decision of the Divisional Court; however, its reasoning was slightly dif-
ferent.92 The appellate court found that retention of the DNA samples 
violated the right to a private life under Article 8(1),93 but that it was 
justified under Article 8(2) because it was in the interest of preventing 
and solving crime.94 
 Three years after the initial arrests, the House of Lords returned to 
the reasoning of the Divisional Court and held that the retention of the 
fingerprints and DNA samples did not engage Article 8(1).95 Without 
an ECHR decision to guide him,96 Lord Steyn based his opinion on the 
explanations of Judge Leveson in his earlier decision and the findings 
of Dr. Bramley, the Chief Scientist of the Forensic Science Service and 
Custodian of the National DNA Database.97 Dr. Bramley explained that 
                                                                                                                      
90 See id. at 3227–28. 
91Marper, 1 W.L.R. at 2203 (H.L.). Leveson found that: 
[A] person can only be identified by fingerprint or DNA sample either by an 
expert or with the use of sophisticated equipment or both; in both cases, it is 
essential to have some sample with which to compare the retained data. Fur-
ther, in the context of the storage of this type of information within records 
retained by the police, the material stored says nothing about the physical 
make-up, characteristics or life of the person to whom they belong. 
Id. at 2209. 
92 See id. at 2204 (H.L.). 
93 Marper, 1 W.L.R. at 3234 (A.C.). 
94 See id. at 3237. Article 8(2) states: 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democ-
ratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic 
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and free-
doms of others. 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
art. 8(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230 [hereinafter European Convention]. 
95 See Marper, 1 W.L.R. at 2210 (H.L.). 
96 Id. at 2207. Had there been a decision by the European Court directly on this issue, 
the House of Lords would have at least had to take it into account under the Human 
Rights Act 1998. See Marper, 1 W.L.R. at 3233 (A.C.). 
97 See Marper, 1 W.L.R. at 2209 (H.L.). 
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the retained samples could only be used “for purposes related to the 
prevention or detection of crime, the investigation of an offence or the 
conduct of a prosecution.”98 
 The Law Lords’ ruling was not without a “dissent” by Baroness 
Hale of Richmond, who agreed with the dismissal of the appeal99 but 
sharply criticized the suggestion that retention did not violate Article 
8(1).100 Hale’s reasoning was rooted in the concept of informational 
privacy, which operates off the assumption that “information about a 
person is in a fundamental way his own,” and, therefore, that person 
should have control over who may be privy to such information.101 
While acknowledging that an individual does not have absolute control 
over all of his or her information, Hale noted that a person’s genetic 
make-up is perhaps the most private type of information and should be 
protected by Article 8.102 
 Despite their disagreement over whether retention constitutes a 
violation of the Convention, the Lords were in agreement that such a 
retention policy was justified under Article 8(2).103 Given the limited 
purpose for which the retained samples could be used, Lord Steyn held 
that those purposes, namely prevention of crime and the government’s 
interest in protecting society’s right to be free from crime, were firmly 
established within Article 8(2).104 In addition, the fact that the samples 
would be of no use without a crime scene sample with which to match it 
led Lord Steyn to conclude that retention was not disproportionate in 
its effect because individuals like the appellants would be unaffected 
unless implicated in a future crime.105 
                                                                                                                      
98 Id. The House of Lords was unconvinced by the appellants’ argument that the pro-
scribed purposes for the use of retained samples were overly broad and would allow other 
uses. See id. at 2209–10. 
99 Id. at 2219. 
100 Id. at 2217. In the House of Lords, the Lords issue their opinions seriatim, which al-
lows each Lord to express his or her own opinion as to how he or she would decide the 
case. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, 20th Annual Leo and 
Berry Eizenstat Memorial Lecture: The Role of Dissenting Opinions (Oct. 21, 2007), avail-
able at http://www/supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_10–21–07.html. 
101 See Marper, 1 W.L.R. at 2217 (H.L.). Baroness Hale also quoted a report by the Ca-
nadian Privacy Commissioner, which succinctly stated that “[t]he measure of our privacy is 
the degree of control we exercise over what others know about us.” Id. 
102 Id. at 2218. 
103 Id. at 2212, 2216, 2219. Having already decided that the appeal should be dismissed 
on Article 8(1) grounds, this portion of the court’s opinion was dicta. It is, however, im-
portant to the overall discussion of this case’s treatment in British courts and the ECHR. 
See id. 
104 See id. at 2210–11 (citing Marper, 1 W.L.R. at 3243 (A.C.)). 
105 See id. at 2211 (H.L.). 
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 Having had no success in the United Kingdom, Marper and S peti-
tioned the ECHR,106 known for its liberal interpretation of Convention 
rights.107 Almost nine years after their initial arrests, they prevailed.108 
The ECHR distanced itself from the judgment in the House of Lords in 
two ways. First, it held that retention and storing of data relating to an 
individual’s private life was a per se interference under Article 8, re-
gardless of any subsequent uses of the data.109 Focusing on the content 
of the data, the court noted that the samples were of a “highly personal 
nature” and interfered with the right to privacy because they contained 
personal data unique to the specific individual.110 
 Second, the court held that the retention program did not satisfy 
the justification requirement under Article 8(2).111 The crux of this 
part of the decision was the determination that the retention program 
was not “necessary in a democratic society,”112 which requires that “the 
action taken is in response to a pressing social need, and that the inter-
ference with the rights protected is no greater than is necessary to ad-
dress that pressing social need.”113 The lack of support among the oth-
er Contracting States greatly influenced the court’s conclusion that the 
U.K. was unable to strike a proper balance between the private interests 
                                                                                                                      
106 S & Marper, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1169. 
107 Donald W. Jackson, The United Kingdom Confronts the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights 29 (1997). 
108 S & Marper, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1202. 
109 Id. at 1189. 
110 Id. at 1190–91. 
111 See id. at 1202. 
112 Id. The ECHR has recognized four general principles that underlie the “democratic 
society” requirement: 
(a) the adjective ‘necessary’ is not synonymous with ‘indispensable’, neither 
has it the flexibility of such expressions as ‘admissible’, ‘ordinary’, ‘useful’, 
‘reasonable’, or ‘desirable’; 
(b) the Contracting States enjoy a certain but not unlimited margin of appre-
ciation in the matter of the imposition of restrictions, but it is for the Court to 
give the final ruling on whether they are compatible with the Convention; 
(c) the phrase ‘necessary in a democratic society’ means that, to be compati-
ble with the Convention, the interference must, inter alia, correspond to a 
‘pressing social need’ and be ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’; 
(d) those paragraphs of Article of the Convention which provide for an ex-
ception to a right guaranteed are to be narrowly interpreted. 
Silver v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 5947/72, 6205/73, 7052/75, 7061/75, 7107/75, 
7113/75, & 7136/75, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 347, 376–77 (1983). 
113 Clare Ovey & Robin C.A. White, The European Convention on Human 
Rights 232 (4th ed. 2006). 
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of the citizen and the public interests justifying interference.114 Still, the 
ECHR generally grants a margin of appreciation, but that margin is 
narrower when an intimate right is involved, and where there is a con-
sensus among the Member States on the issue.115 Categorizing the re-
tention program as “blanket and indiscriminate,”116 the ECHR con-
cluded that although the detection and prevention of crime is a 
legitimate aim,117 the proper balance was not met given the failure of 
British authorities to consider, inter alia, the nature of the crime, the 
age of the suspect, and the indefiniteness of sample retention.118 
B. The Concept of Privacy in the Convention and British Law 
1. The Right to a Private Life 
 Under Article 8(1) of the Convention, “[e]veryone has the right to 
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspon-
dence.”119 This right is qualified by Article 8(2), which allows a public 
authority to interfere with the right if it is necessary for the furtherance 
of certain public interests.120 On a theoretical level, the ECHR based its 
interpretation of Article 8 on the notion that “boundaries can and 
should be placed around such aspects of an individual’s life, preventing 
such intrusion and thereby protecting personal autonomy.”121 This un-
derlying theory, however, has never given rise to a fixed definition of 
what constitutes a private life.122 Instead, the ECHR has created an um-
brella under which certain elements of a person’s physical and social 
identity are deemed part of a private life, such as that person’s name, 
gender, sexual orientation, health, ethnic identity, and an overall right 
                                                                                                                      
114 See S & Marper, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1199–1200. The court noted that England, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland were the only Contracting States that have an indefinite re-
tention policy. See id. at 1199. 
115 See id. at 1197. A margin of appreciation allows the ECHR to defer to the authorities 
in the forum state, who are likely to be better placed “to balance individual rights against 
general societal interests.” Fenwick, supra note 84, at 36. The ECHR’s application of the 
margin of appreciation doctrine has not been very consistent, making it difficult to predict 
the approach the court will take in determining the scope of the margin. See id. 
116 See S & Marper, Eur H.R. Rep. at 1200. 
117 See id. at 1197. 
118 Id. at 1200–01. 
119 European Convention, art. 8(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230. 
120 See id. art. 8(2). 
121 Fenwick, supra note 84, at 804. 
122 See Karen Reid, A Practitioner’s Guide to the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights 443 (2d ed. 2004). 
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to his or her image.123 Moreover, it covers the physical and psychologi-
cal integrity of a person, and the right to personal development and the 
establishment of relationships with others.124 The right to a private life 
is therefore seen as broader than the mere right to privacy125 and is 
continuously being widened by the ECHR.126 
2. The History of Privacy Jurisprudence in English Law 
 Despite its rich legal tradition, which has served as a model for 
many legal systems around the world, the English common law has his-
torically never embraced the idea of a right to privacy,127 prompting 
one prominent jurist to state that “[i]t is well-known that in English Law 
there is no right to privacy.”128 That is not to say that the necessary basis 
for such a right was lacking in early English legal history,129 as evi-
denced by the classic observation that a man’s home is his castle.130 
Still, a sound law on privacy remained undeveloped, due in large part 
to the inability of the courts and Parliament to derive a clear definition 
of the right.131 Prior to the passing of the Human Rights Act (HRA) in 
1998, British law offered an incomplete scheme of privacy protection, 
with any real protection coming from the ECHR.132 The HRA, which 
incorporated the Convention into United Kingdom law, afforded Brit-
ish citizens their first true right to privacy by making the Convention 
directly enforceable, in British courts, against the government.133 A citi-
zen could therefore challenge a piece of legislation on the grounds that 
it was incompatible with the Convention.134 
                                                                                                                      
123 See S. and Marper, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1189. 
124 Id. 
125 See Reid, supra note 122, at 444. 
126 Fenwick, supra note 84, at 803. 
127 See David Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales 
381 (1993). 
128 Kaye v. Robertson, [1991] F.S.R. 62, 66 (A.C.) (U.K.). 
129 See Feldman, supra note 127, at 381–82. 
130 See William Morris & Mary Morris, Morris Dictionary of Word and Phrase 
Origins 374 (2d ed. 1988) (“This saying is as old as the basic concepts of English common 
law.”). 
131 See Feldman, supra note 127, at 382. 
132 See Fenwick, supra note 84, at 807–08. 
133 See id. at 808. It is uncontroverted that there was no right to privacy in the United 
Kingdom prior to the Human Rights Act; yet, it is interesting to note that Lord Hoffman of 
the House of Lords argued that “[t]he United Kingdom subscribed to the Convention 
because it set out rights which British subjects enjoyed under the common law.” See Wil-
liams & Johnson, supra note 30, at 237. 
134 See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 4. Despite their ability to declare primary legis-
lation incompatible with the Convention, British courts do not have the power to strike 
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 The incorporation of the Convention, however, has done little to 
clarify the meaning of privacy in the United Kingdom because British 
courts are free to interpret the values of the HRA so long as such inter-
pretation does not undermine the protections of the Convention.135 
British courts attempting to do so, however, are plagued by the lack of a 
domestic tradition of privacy and the unwillingness of the ECHR to 
clearly define the right to a private life.136 As a result, persons alleging a 
violation of Article 8 may have greater success in the ECHR than in 
British courts.137 
III. Analysis 
 The ECHR’s decision in Marper left open the question of proper 
remedial action by the United Kingdom.138 Under Article 46(1) of the 
Convention, “[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the 
final judgments of the Court in any case to which they are parties.”139 In 
many cases, this requires no more than paying compensation and costs 
to the applicant through the process of just satisfaction.140 There are 
instances, however, where enforcement of the judgment requires sub-
stantive changes to the violating law or practice of the forum state.141 In 
Marper, the ECHR noted that “[i]n these circumstances, the Court con-
siders that the finding of a violation, with the consequences which will 
ensue for the future, may be regarded as constituting sufficient just sat-
isfaction in this respect.”142 Thus, it is clear that in order to comply with 
the judgment, the ECHR intends for the United Kingdom to make 
                                                                                                                      
down the legislation, and a declaration of incompatibility does not affect the validity or 
continued operation of the law. See id. § 4(6); Human Rights and Criminal Justice 174 
(Ben Emmerson et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
135 See Klug, supra note 62, at 706. 
136 Andrew Roberts & Nick Taylor, Privacy and the DNA Database, 4 Eur. Hum. Rts. L. 
Rev. 373, 376 (2005). 
137 Compare S & Marper, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1202, with Marper, 1 W.L.R. at 2210 (H.L.). 
138 See Case of S & Marper v. The United Kingdom, App. Nos. 30562/04 & 30566/04, 
48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 50, 1204 (2009). 
139 European Convention, supra note 94, art. 46(1) (formerly art. 53). 
140 Human Rights and Criminal Justice, supra note 134, at 60. Just satisfaction is 
granted when there is no total reparation in the domestic law of the forum country. Reid, 
supra note 122, at 545. The ECHR will normally award just satisfaction for pecuniary loss, 
non-pecuniary loss (such as pain and suffering, or physical and mental injury), and costs 
and expenses. See id. at 546, 554. The underlying principle of just satisfaction is equity. See 
id. at 546. 
141 Human Rights and Criminal Justice, supra note 134, at 60 (noting that in a 
number of cases, “the judgment may require legislative, constitutional, administrative or 
regulatory amendment”). 
142 S & Marper, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1204. 
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some sort of change to its retention policy.143 The question that re-
mains is how far it must go, bearing in mind that a complete reversal of 
the retention legislation would essentially eliminate any usefulness of 
the Database,144 while whole-hearted noncompliance with the judg-
ment may subject the United Kingdom to expulsion from the Council 
of Europe.145 
A. Problems with the ECHR Decision 
 There are three key problems with the ECHR decision that un-
dermine the validity of its reasoning.146 First, the ECHR noted that ac-
quitted individuals had very limited means by which they could have 
their data removed from the Database.147 The big problem, according 
to the court, was the lack of “independent review of the justification for 
the retention according to defined criteria.”148 Such criteria would in-
clude the seriousness of the offence, previous arrests, and the strength 
of suspicion against the person.149 This type of review, however, would 
introduce a level of discrimination into the process that contravenes 
Article 14 of the Convention.150 If the authorities were charged with 
making post-acquittal determinations on retention, those who had 
their samples retained would be singled out from the larger group as 
individuals who were really not as innocent, despite a not guilty ver-
dict.151 In fact, this procedure was rejected by Lord Justice Waller in his 
Court of Appeal opinion in Marper : 
                                                                                                                      
143 See id. Exactly what steps must be taken is for the forum state to decide, in conjunc-
tion with the Committee of Ministers, which is tasked with supervising the execution of 
judgments. See Reid, supra note 122, at 545. “The Court has no express jurisdiction . . . to 
issue directions to Contracting States on the measures or steps which they should take to 
rectify violations.” Id. 
144 See DNA Database ‘Breach of Rights,’ supra note 9. 
145 See Human Rights and Criminal Justice, supra note 134, at 61. 
146 See S. and Marper, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1199–1201. 
147 Id. at 1200. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. But see R (S & Marper) v. Chief Constable of the S. Yorkshire Police, (2002) 1 
W.L.R. 3223, 3242 (A.C.) (U.K) (“At the retention stage consideration of the circum-
stances of the offense of which the person has by this stage been acquitted seems to me 
almost certainly irrelevant.”) (Waller, L.J.). 
150 See European Convention, supra note 94, art. 14. Article 14 states “[t]he enjoyment 
of rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination 
on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other sta-
tus.” Id. 
151 See Marper, 1 W.L.R. at 3242–43 (A.C.) (Waller, L.J.). 
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If justification for retention is in any degree to be by reference 
to the view of the police on the degree of innocence, then per-
sons who have been acquitted and have their samples retained 
can justifiably say this stigmatises or discriminates against me— 
I am part of a pool of acquitted persons presumed to be inno-
cent, but I am being treated as though I was not.152 
 When retention becomes conditional on a further determination 
of guilt, or a lesser degree of innocence, the message being sent is that 
a sample is kept in the Database because the person to whom it belongs 
is more likely to be a suspect in a later crime.153 While some commenta-
tors have argued that the Database is intended to represent the likely 
criminal community,154 such a position, if adopted by the government, 
would undermine the goal of preventing and solving crime, which has 
been greatly facilitated by police access to as large a database as possi-
ble.155 Additionally, the use of the criteria suggested by the ECHR, 
whether at the time of collection or after an acquittal, would further 
defeat the purpose of the Database.156 As demonstrated by the legisla-
tive progression of the retention program, the Database is more useful 
when the police have access to a larger class of citizens as opposed to 
only those suspected of committing the most serious offenses.157 
 The second problem with the ECHR decision is its contention that 
innocent people who have their DNA retained are stigmatized by sim-
ply being in the Database.158 This position is based on the notion that 
those who are acquitted are treated the same way as those who are con-
victed.159 While it is true that both classes of people would have their 
samples retained, there is no merit to the idea that such a policy is ac-
tually harmful to the acquitted individuals.160 To say that retaining the 
sample of an acquitted person equates them with a convicted offender 
is simply untenable, given the fact that the purpose of the Database is to 
                                                                                                                      
152 Id. 
153 See Nuffield Council on Bioethics, supra note 80, at 33. 
154 See id. 
155 See Marper, 1 W.L.R. at 3243 (A.C.). 
156 See id. 
157 See Marper, 1 W.L.R. at 3242 (“The bigger the databank the better.”) (Waller, L.J.). 
158 See S & Marper, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1201. 
159 See id. 
160 See id. at 1204. The ECHR found that it was not necessary to compensate the appli-
cants for “distress and anxiety caused by the knowledge that intimate information about 
each of them had been unjustifiably retained.” Id. at 1203. 
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aid law enforcement with access to a larger class of citizens, not likely or 
actual offenders.161 
 Finally, the ECHR placed too much emphasis on the practices of 
the other Contracting States with regards to their retention policies.162 
The development of DNA technology and the use of DNA in crime 
prevention and investigation are relatively recent.163 In this respect, 
many of the Member States lag behind the United Kingdom in their 
use of DNA databases.164 Furthermore, it can hardly be said that a true 
consensus exists among the Member States, except that no other state 
has indefinite retention.165 But this is certainly not enough, in light of 
the fact that there are a number of differences between the retention 
policies of the other states.166 In fact, many states place limitations on 
DNA retention that actually result in the type of discrimination and 
post-acquittal determinations of guilt that the United Kingdom policy 
has avoided.167 Therefore, the ECHR appears to have found Member 
State consensus on an issue that is still being developed, and as such, 
should not have used the consensus as a basis for eroding the margin of 
appreciation that must be afforded to the United Kingdom.168 
B. A “Democratic Society” Means More Debate 
 In light of the analytical flaws in the ECHR opinion, it is the posi-
tion of this Note that the judgment of the ECHR is incorrect with re-
spect to its treatment of the justification question. As a result, the Unit-
ed Kingdom’s response should not include elimination of the Database 
or the retention program. Instead, proper compliance should focus on 
                                                                                                                      
161 Cf. R (S & Marper) v. Chief Constable of the S. Yorkshire Police, (2004) 1 W.L.R. 
2196, 2219 (H.L.) (U.K.) (“The present system is designed to allow the collection of as 
many samples as possible and to retain as much as possible of what it has. The benefit of 
the aims of accurate and efficient law enforcement is thereby enhanced.”) (Baroness 
Hale). 
162 See S & Marper, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1199. 
163 See id. 
164 Id. 
165 See id. at 1184. 
166 See id. 
167 See id. For example, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands allow retention, 
after acquittal, if “further suspicions remain about the person.” Id. In Poland, DNA sam-
ples are retained when the person has been acquitted of certain serious crimes. Id. 
168 Cf. Fenwick, supra note 84, at 38 (“[W]here practice is still in the process of chang-
ing and may be said to be at an inchoate stage as far as the Member states generally are 
concerned, the Court may not be prepared to place itself at the forefront of such changes 
. . . .”). 
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a re-examination of the place of the Database in the United Kingdom’s 
democratic society. 
 It has been maintained that the Convention is to be uniformly in-
terpreted by the Member States.169 At the same time, the ECHR has 
always interpreted the Convention in “light of present-day conditions” 
and with “regard to the changing conditions in contracting states.”170 
These two maxims are seemingly inconsistent with each other because, 
under Article 8, the conditions within a particular state should not af-
fect the interpretation of the substantive right, but those conditions are 
an important factor in determining whether valid justification exists 
under Article 8(2).171 This issue can be resolved by recognizing that 
democracy gives birth to rights,172 and the will of the people should 
therefore be afforded greater weight in the ECHR’s analysis.173 
 Despite its inclusion as a requirement for justification in Article 
8(2), the ECHR has not formally adopted a definition for a “democ-
ratic society.”174 Instead, the court has simply acknowledged certain 
qualities as being important elements of such a society.175 Democracy is 
a central theme of the Convention, and the ECHR should be willing to 
revert back to the traditional meaning of democracy when analyzing a 
state’s interference with a protected right.176 A democracy, in simplest 
                                                                                                                      
169 See Marper, 1 W.L.R. at 2208 (quoting R. v. Special Adjudicator, (2004) 3 W.L.R. 23, 
39–40 (H.L.) (U.K.)). 
170 Rabinder Singh, Interpreting Bills of Rights, 29 Statute L. Rev. 82, 89 (2008). 
171 Roberts & Taylor, supra note 136, at 377 (describing the House of Lords’ treatment 
of this issue in Marper). 
172 See Martin Loughlin, Rights, Democracy, and Law, in Sceptical Essays on Human 
Rights 42 (Tom Campbell et al. eds., 2001). 
173 Concededly, the ECHR has noted that the will of the majority is not always the same 
thing as democratic values. See Human Rights and Criminal Justice, supra note 134, at 
71. Nevertheless, given the fact that the purpose of the retention program falls squarely 
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greater importance. Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissent-
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174 See Ovey & White, supra note 113, at 233. 
175 See id. The ECHR has regarded pluralism, tolerance, broadmindedness, equality, li-
berty, and self-fulfillment as “important ingredients of any democracy.” Id. See generally 
Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, & 41344/98, 37 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 1 (2003) (discussing what is necessary for a democratic society). 
176 See European Convention, supra note 94, pmbl. (noting that the signatories were 
“reaffirming their profound belief in those Fundamental Freedoms which are the founda-
tion of justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one hand by an ef-
fective political democracy”). 
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terms, is a government by the people.177 Every Member State in the 
Council of Europe, despite their diverse political histories, now exists as 
some form of a democratic society.178 As such, the will of the citizens of 
each country is reflected in the legislation of that country.179 
 The importance of the rights guaranteed by the Convention is not 
uniform because the legal status of the Convention in each state is dif-
ferent.180 Thus, in light of the principles of democracy engrained in the 
Convention (and especially the justification requirement of Article 8), 
the ECHR should defer to the will of the people of the forum state 
when a piece of legislation (as opposed to a state practice) is alleged to 
violate a right.181 Granted, there has been little debate in the United 
Kingdom concerning the Database and it may be that the current re-
tention policy runs contrary to the expressed will of the people.182 The 
ECHR’s decision provides the citizens of the United Kingdom the op-
portunity to engage in a robust debate about the place of the retention 
program in their democratic society.183 
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May 2009, the Home Office published a consultation to “develop a DNA framework which 
has the support and confidence of the public and achieves a proportionate balance between 
the rights of the individual and protection of the public.” See Home Office, Keeping the 
Right People on the DNA Database 4 (2009). After a period of public response, the 
Home Office proposed a series of changes to the current blanket retention policy. See Alan 
Johnson, Secretary of State, Home Department, Ministerial Statement on DNA and Finger-
print Retention, Nov. 11, 2009, http://search.homeoffice.gov.uk (search “Ministerial State-
ment on DNA”; follow first hyperlink). Under the new policy, DNA samples are to be de-
stroyed after six months, while DNA profiles may be kept for as little as three years 
(unconvicted juveniles under the age of sixteen) to as much as indefinite retention (con-
victed adults, juveniles convicted of serious crimes, or juveniles with two convictions for any 
offense). See id. Unconvicted adults and juveniles ages sixteen and seventeen will have their 
DNA profiles retained for six years. See id. These proposals have been placed in the Crime 
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Conclusion 
 The United Kingdom’s National DNA Database has had a long 
and successful tenure, providing the rest of the world with an example 
for their databases. It has been built over the past two decades through 
a series of legislative amendments to the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984. These legislative changes reflect not only the will of the peo-
ple but also the careful balancing of privacy rights with the public in-
terest in preventing and solving crime. This has been demonstrated by 
the House of Lords’ approval of the retention policy in place in the 
United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the full spectrum of police power un-
der the retention program is less popular in the rest of Europe. The 
ECHR’s decision in Marper highlights the problem that exists when the 
court determines what is necessary in a democratic society without con-
sidering that it was a democratic society in the first place that passed the 
legislation in question. There is no disputing that times and attitudes 
change, and what once carried favor among the public may now be out 
of touch with the reality of a society. In the United Kingdom, while 
most supported the retention policy in light of sensational convictions 
made possible by DNA retention, there has always been a lack of mean-
ingful public debate over the extent of DNA retention and the Data-
base. The Marper decision now gives the United Kingdom the opportu-
nity to hold that debate and to determine whether its “democratic 
society” still supports the Database. 
                                                                                                                      
and Security Bill 2009 and are now before Parliament. See generally Crime and Security Bill, 
2009, Bill [3] (Eng., W., N. Ir.). Despite the government’s attempt to comply with the Marper 
decision, there are still those who perceive retention of DNA of unconvicted persons as a 
violation of human rights. See DNA Database Is an Abuse of Our Rights, Telegraph (London), 
Nov. 11, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ (search “DNA Database is an abouse of our 
rights”; follow first hyperlink under “Most Relevant” list). 
 
